This paper tests for contagion …rstly, within the Euro Area (EA thereafter), and secondly from the US to Europe. Using "coexceedances" -the joint occurrences of extreme negative and positive returns in di¤erent countries in a given day -I de…ne contagion as the fraction of the coexceedances that cannot be explained by fundamentals (covariates). Having applied a multinomial logistic regression model to daily returns on 11 European stock markets for the period 2004-2011, I can provide the following summary of the results. Firstly, I found evidence of contagion within EA. Especially, the EA 10 year government bond yield and the EUR/USD exchange rate, fail to adequately explain about the probability of coexceedances in Europe.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to shed some light to the existence or not of contagion within the Europe region, but also to detect, if any, contagion e¤ect from the US to Europe. In other words, I am interested to contribute to a better understanding of the degree to which European markets have become interconnected and to the level in which the sub-prime crisis started in the US, spread across borders and increased or decreased the likelihood of a crisis in the EA.
The understanding of the relationship between …nancial markets signi…es a key question, which has spawned a number of studies. Both investors and policymakers are particularly keen to understand the mechanisms that link markets -in order to be able, …rstly to assess the bene…ts of portfolio diversi…cation and secondly to maintain …nancial stability. This motivation is even bigger in times of …nancial crisis, where the vital question is whether and how the crisis propagates from one market or country to another. The question is whether or not we can we classify this di¤usion of shocks from one country to another as contagion.
In the existing literature, there is a widespread disagreement on what is contagion. For some economists contagion exists only when a crisis starts from one economy and spreads to another, when the two economies are located in separate geographic regions, with di¤erent structures and weak cross-market linkages. Others prefer to use the term shift-contagion. According to this term, contagion is the signi…cant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country or to a group of countries. However, when the degree of comovement between two countries is high prior to the shock and continues being high after the crisis, this does not constitute contagion. We would rather describe this as a normal interdependence between the countries (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) . In the present paper, I will use the term "pure contagion", which means that a crisis might trigger additional crises elsewhere for reasons unexplained by fundamentals. In other words, a crisis in one market/country increases the likelihood of a crisis in another market/country over and above what would be implied by the interdependence that prevails between these markets/countries in non-crises times. This contrasts with many studies, which have involved simply comparing comovements before and during the crisis.
In order to detect and identify contagion in …nancial markets, many di¤erent approaches have been proposed. On the one hand, we …nd studies that attempt to measure the e¤ect of a shock in one country on another country: i) leading indicator approaches (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998 ; Berg and Pattillo, 1999) and ii) probit/logit models (Eichengreen, There is a vast number of studies, King and Wadhwani (1990) , Boyer et al. (1999) , Loretan and English (2000) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) among others, which have been conducting tests on signi…cant changes in correlations between asset returns during tranquil and turmoil periods.
There are mainly two reasons why pure correlation-based tests are inappropriate and invalid for contagion testing. Firstly, correlation-based tests are a positive function of volatility. Given the fact that during crises …nancial returns exhibit high volatility, a correlation test is biased upwards resulting in spurious contagion. Secondly, and according to Bae et al. (2003) , correlation coe¢ cient is a linear measure which gives equal weight to negative and positive return. This contradicts the de…nition of contagion as a measure which captures non-linear changes in …nancial markets. For these reasons, this study will concentrate on the …rst strand and especially to multinomial logit models.
Another strand of the literature rather than looking in correlation, is focusing on extreme events in di¤erent …nancial markets and on the probability of observing large returns across di¤erent markets or countries given than in one market or country there are already extreme tail events.
Bae et al. (2003) used a binomial logistic regression model for the extreme stock events in United
States and Europe for the period 1995-2000. Their model which is estimated separately for negativeand positive-tail events, shows evidence that interest rates, opposite to stock market volatility and exchange rate, might be a source of contagion within the Euro Area. Additionally, they conclude that there is contagion phenomenon from US to EA, as extreme returns happening in the United The quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett (1978) , applied from Baur and Schulze (2005) , in order to analyse not only the occurrence of extreme events, but also the degree of the negative joint occurrences. The authors concentrate only to Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia, as the source countries of the Asian crisis, testing for contagion e¤ects from the United States, the Latin America, the Europe and other Asian countries. The results are mixed, in some cases they found contagion, in other cases interdependence. Investigating the link between extreme events on the stock and currency markets, Cumperayot et al. (2006) applied a bivariate probit model and conclude that only for some countries (Brazil, Canada, US and Switzerland) in total of 26 countries, currency depreciation does decrease the probability of a stock market decline. Other papers use multinomial logistic methods to investigate cross-border contagion of European banks.
One of those, Groop et al. (2006) , using the distance to default measure were able to examine the occurrence of large changes in this measure as describing major shocks in banks' …nancial condition. The results show signi…cant evidence that the cross-border contagion have increased since the introduction of euro. Fazio (2007) based on bivariate probit models he tried to identify contagion currency crises using exchange market pressure indices between country pairs for a sample of 14 emerging economies.
By distinguishing between the transmission of shocks due to macroeconomic interdependence and contagion due to herding, he …nds evidence of contagion for few cases only and especially between countries belonging to the same region. In another paper, Christiansen three categories of crashes, local; regional; and global crash, and following an ordered logit model conclude that: …rst, there is signi…cant evidence that less severe crashes tend to be followed by more severe crashes; and second, the stock, bond and currency markets are important determinants of the probabilities of the di¤erent crash events.
In this paper, I propose to investigate the contagion e¤ect -if any -within the EA as well as from the US to EA, examining how often extreme (negative and positive) returns on di¤erent markets occur simultaneously. Using a negative-positive coexceedance variable that counts the number of large negative-positive returns on a given day across countries, I provide an answer to the question: "How likely is it for a market or a country to have large returns on a particular day, given that some other market or country have large returns on that day or the preceding day?". Borrowing the de…nition of contagion from Bae, Karolyi and Stulz, (2003), I de…ne contagion within regions the fraction of exceedance events that is not explained by the explanatory variables (such as exchange rate, interest rate, market volatility). On the other hand, contagion from the US to EA exists if the US exceedances explain coexceedances happen in EA.
In addition, with this particular framework, I am able to allow for both types of transmission mechanisms, contagion and interdependence. When two countries are closely linked to each other through economic fundamentals, trade links, political links or geographical position, among others, then the spillover of shock from the one to another will be the result of the normal dependence between the two markets. Consequently, we can say that interdependence refers to the dependent that exists both in tranquil or turbulence times. On the other hand, contagion constitutes a form of dependence that does not exists in tranquil times but only occurs in times when large or extreme shocks to …nancial markets occur. According to Dornbusch et al. (2000) , contagion cannot be linked to observed changes in macroeconomics or other fundamentals and is solely the result of the behaviour of investors, …nancial agents or due to other irrational phenomena, such as …nancial panic, herd behavior or loss of con…dence. As I described earlier, in this paper I de…ne contagion as the dependence that still exists after correcting for interdependence (fundamentals).
Using a multivariate logistic regression model, I am able to examine which covariates-factors are associated with the coexceedances count variables. The main results of this paper can be summarised as follows. First, I found that EA 10 year government bond yield, 3 month EURIBOR rate and EUR/USD are important determinants of regional crash. These covariates fail to explain extreme returns happen in EA, and therefore there is evidence of contagion from this markets towards the stock market. What is more, there is evidence in favour of the continuation e¤ect.
This means that extreme negative returns do not occur abruptly but rather evolve out of prior negative extreme returns. The probability of observing a crisis tomorrow in EA, in the sense of joint occurrence of extreme negative returns in four or more countries simultaneously, increases when regional crash occurs today. Second, the results show that there is no evidence of contagion from the US to EA. Results show that the probability of extreme returns in EA is not statistically signi…cant related to extreme returns happening in the US. According to the de…nition of contagion mentioned above, this constitutes that there is no contagion phenomenon from the US towards the EA, but only interdependence between the two markets. This result is also supported from the fact that all the coe¢ cients of the US stock market volatility variable are statistcially signi…cant at 1% signi…cance level, which indicates the occurrence of interdependence.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the multinomial logit model, while Section 3 presents the data. In Section 4, I set-up the di¤erent models to be tested and present the empirical results, while in Section 5 I describe all the robustness checks that I performed. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and areas of future research.
Model
The paper follows the approach employed by Bae et al. (2003) and Christiansen and Ranaldo In this model, the dependent variable (negative and positive extreme returns) is an indicator of a discrete choice. At this point, I need to introduce the exceedance and coexceedance terms.
An exceedance can be de…ned as the occurrence of an extreme negative (positive) return which lies below (above) a given threshold value of the return distribution in one country. Similarly, coexceedance refers to the occurrence of extreme negative and positive returns in di¤erent countries at the same day. In line with Bae et al. (2003) , I arbitrary choose the tail probability 5% for the de…nition of extremes. This decision can be defended given the large sample of daily observations, implying the empirical distribution will typically contain a large number of observations in the tails. In addition, the 5% threshold ensures that su¢ cient observations will be available to estimate the logit model and the conditional probabilities. 1 After all, I distinguish between the following 1 As a robustness check and in order to investigate the sensitivity of my results to the 5% quantile, in Section 5 I events: no extreme return for a given day; only one country with an extreme return (exceedance); two countries with an extreme return (co-exceedance); three countries with an extreme return; and four or more countries with an extreme event (contagion).
The basic idea is to analyse each of these events in the general framework of probabilities model:
Pr(event j occurs) = Pr(Y i = j) = F (covariates-explanatory variables) f or j = 1; : : : ; m (1)
where the function F (:) on the right-hand side will be devises using a logistic cumulative distribution. In addition, the set of covariates re ‡ects the impact of changes in "relevant e¤ects" (the independent variables) on the probability of observing a negative or a positive extreme return. In general form, by assuming that the probability associated with an event j of m possible events is given by Pr(Y i = j), then the multinomial distribution can be de…ned as:
f or j = 0; 1; : : : ; m
where x is a vector of explanatory variables (including constant) and j is a vector of coe¢ cients for categories j to m. In order to remove the indeterminacy associated with the model, the event Y = 0 (zero exceedances) will be the base category. Therefore, all coe¢ cients are estimated relative to this base:
The model is estimated using the log-likelihood function:
where N is the number of observations, I ij is an indicator variable that equals one if the i th observation falls in j th event and zero otherwise. If the model contains no covariates, but only a constant term, then the restricted log-likelihood is:
will estimate all the models using di¤erent exceedances de…nitions.
where p j is the sample proportion of observations that make choice j. In order to measure how well the model …ts the data, as well as the percentage of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the estimated model, I am using the McFadden's pseudo-R 2 goodness-of-…t:
where LL u is the value of the log-likelihood function at the estimated parameters, the full unrestricted model, and LL r is its value when all the parameters -except constants -are set equal to zero (base model 
which measure the marginal changes in the response probabilities for any given unit change in the independent covariate. All the models are estimated using PCGive in OxMetrics.
Data
While most studies calculate exceedances in terms of the sample period (unconditional) returns, in this paper I will use the standardised residuals of a GARCH model, and then based on them I will construct my co-exceedances variables. is no strong evidence for serial correlation in levels, while the squared returns are strongly correlated, which suggests temporal variation in second moments -evidence of time-varying volatility (heteroskedasticity). Table 2 illustrates unconditional correlations among the countries for the full sample period.
One can see that all values are positive, thereby re ‡ecting regional and economic relationships 4 The annualised values are computed using 252 trading days per year. 5 The fact that for Ireland the kurtosis value is two to three times larger than that of other countries indicates that for Ireland there are more events at the tails (extreme events). among countries. Particularly, I notice that the correlation is the lowest between Greek and Irish industrial stock returns (0.30) 6 , while correlation is the largest between France and Denmark (0.86).
Given the well-known time variability of correlations, these sample correlations may be biased and misleading. Figures 1 to 3 plot the index series for all countries over the entire sample period, while …gures 4 to 6 plot the return series. All the series were tested on whether they are consistent with an I(1) process with a stochastic trend, or if they are consistent with I(0) process, which means that they are stationary, with a deterministic trend. I also report the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, which rejects the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in the levels, so the series are all stationary.
In Table 3 , I report the number of negative (RN t ) and positive (RP t ) exceedances and coexceedances for the 11 European markets. The total 1975 days in my sample are divided into …ve categories: those for which there are no exceedances in any country (1544 such days for negative extreme events); only one exceedance (240 for negative extreme returns); two; three; and four or more coexceedances. I also identify which countries participate in those events and how often. The columns labeled "5 th quantile", "95 th quantile", "Mean" and "Volatility" report the 5% and 95%
quantile of the standardized residuals together with the mean value and the volatility. The lowest mean for negative extreme returns belongs to Austria, Espania and Italy indicating that in these countries the extreme returns introduce more risk. Furthermore, the high volatility for Espania, Greece and Ireland implies that negative returns vary more in these countries than in the other countries. Looking at the top-tail events, two countries (Ireland and Portugal) experiencing the higher values of mean and volatility, result which is expected if someone take closer look at the descriptive statistic of the series.
What is more, Table 4 Panel B of Table 4 shows the transition probabilities using the de…nition of exceedances based on standardized residuals. As I said earlier, my aim is to examine whether the results of exceedances dynamics are driven by the volatility e¤ect which is observed during times of extreme downturns.
After controlling for volatility, I observe lower probabilities for three and four or more exceedances when an exceedance occurred on the previous day. For some cases the transition probabilities between the di¤erent events become particularly large compared with those of Panel A. For instance, the probability of observing extreme negative return in three countries today and a joint occurrence (four or more countries) tomorrow decreases from 0.10 to 0.05. The probability that a joint occurrence continues is 0.04, more than three times lower than the 0.14 for sample returns. Therefore, I conclude that there are volatility dependences in the dynamic patterns of coexceedances, especially concerning the more severe events, that someone should take into account when testing for contagion using extreme return measures. index. By doing so I will be able to see how the two sectors are linked, as well as the dynamics that explain their behavior. Additionally, to investigate whether shocks in the bond market lead to increased crash likelihood, I include daily yields (in euros) on long maturity bonds -10 year government bond yields. I expect a negative e¤ect of bond yields on probabilities of coexceedances.
A fall in their yields -or an increase in their prices -may point at an increase in the probability of four or more countries coexceedances.
I also include the 3-month interbank interest rate (EURIBOR). On average, stock market returns are negatively correlated with interest rates, since the latter imply higher costs of capital. So, I
expect that higher interest rates will increase the contagion probability. For the currency market I use the exchange rate of the euro against the us dollar. If euro has depreciated against the us dollar, extreme returns are more likely to happen. This is true if we think that a depreciation will lead to a lower value of the stock index. Finally, I will also use two covariates related to the US. These are: i) the exceedance variable counting the number of days with extreme negative (below the 5%) and positive (above the 95%) percentile of the standardized residuals of the industrial stock market distribution; and ii) the volatility of the industrial stock market. Volatility is computed as the squared root of the conditional volatility of the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1), following a common practice in the existing literature. To be more precise, I estimate the model:
where " t N (0; 2 t ) and the variance follows a GARCH(1,1) process:
RN t 1 and RP t 1 : lagged values of negative and positive co-exceedances variables.
EAF : return on …nancial stock market index for the European area.
EA10Y : return on 10 year government bond yield for the European area.
EU RIBOR3M : return on 3 month Euro Interbank O¤ered Rate.
EU R=U SD: return on currency exchange rate.
U SRN and U SRP : negative and positive exceedance variable for US.
U SRN t 1 and U SRP t 1 : lagged values of negative and positive exceedance variable for US.
U SI and U SI t 1 : return on industrial stock market index for US and its lagged value.
U SIvol and U SIvol t 1 : volatility of return on industrial stock market index for US and the lagged value.
Empirical framework and results
In this section, I perform four sets of estimations -the base model, the "continuation or reversal e¤ect", the "contagion within Euro Area" model, and the "contagion from the US to EA" model.
Base model
Model 1 of tables 5 and 6 reports estimates of regressions for the bottom and top tails for the EA and provide us with the estimates of probabilities of coexceedances. Equation 1 can be written as a function of the explanatory variables. So, the probability of being in category i is given by:
Note that there is no coe¢ cient for category j = 0, since this is the base model against which I
compare the other models. What I found is that there is a probability of 78.18% that none of the 11 European countries of my sample has a negative extreme return, while for the top-tail events this probability reaches 73.01%. The probability that one country has an extreme negative return is 12.15% (15.95% for top-tail events), while joint occurrence of extreme returns in four-and-more countries is 4.71% (3.75% for positive coexceedances). These probabilities are associated with the coe¢ cients 10 and 40 respectively; and can be easily computed from Equation 2. For example:
Since Model 1 does not include explanatory variables, but only the constant term, these probabilities can also arise form Table 3 , which presents analytically the number of negative and positive exceedances and coexceedances for each country.
Continuation or reversal e¤ect
In this section, I am interested to see if extreme returns -negative and positive exceedancesin stock prices be followed by subsequent movements in the opposite (reversal) or in the same direction (continuation 
The …rst column of each model shows the parameter estimates and their signi…cance level, while the second column presents the impact of each covariate on the probability of exceedances. The third column reports the jointly signi…cance level of each explanatory variable ( j1 = j2 = j3 = j4 = 0). As we observe from those tables, only for the bottom-tail events all (except one) the coe¢ cients are signi…cant and positive, indicating that the more extreme negative returns we have yesterday, the more likely it is to have extreme negative returns today. In other words, there is signi…cant evidence for the presence of a continuation e¤ect. The positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients of the previous day show that extreme negative return follow a domino e¤ect. This result is particularly noteworthy given the fact that I have take into account volatility, since I computed coexceedances using the standardized residuals from a GARCH(1,1) model. We know by de…nition that crises are more likely to occur in times of high volatility.
Moreover, the prob, which expresses the marginal probability of exceedances with respect to the lagged value of this covariate, indicates that an increase in negative returns yesterday increases the probability of all exceedances, but the e¤ect decreases as we move to higher number of joint occurrences. A similar interpretation can be applied to the positive coexceedances, even though the lagged variable is of no importance, as it is only signi…cant at 10% level.
Contagion within Euro Area
Are the coexceedances related to di¤erent asset type returns? In Model 3, the explanatory variables on top of the past values of the coexceedances are: the EA …nancial stock market index returns; the aggregate 10-year government bond for the European area; the short-term (3 month) EURI-BOR interest rate; and the currency exchange rate between euro and US dollar. By adding these covariates, I am interested to see …rst, how the …nancial stock market can increase or decrease the likelihood of extreme returns in the industrial stock market, second, the e¤ect of monetary policy decisions, as adopted by international authorities and policymakers, and third, the impact that credit crunch had on the credit and liquidity risk perception of the market. EURIBOR which is the reference rate at which Euro interbank deposits are being o¤ered within the European Monetary Union zone by one bank to another, re ‡ects the average cost of funding of banks in the interbank market for a speci…c maturity. The model has the form:
For both negative and positive coexceedances, only the …nancial stock market has strong signi…-cant e¤ect, with the coe¢ cients to have the expected sign. In particular, the likelihood of observing negative coexceedances is negatively related to stock returns. This relationship implies that the lower the stock return, the higher the probability that four or more countries will experience negative returns in a given day. Using a numerical example, looking in the marginal e¤ect of this covariate, a 5% decrease in the returns of the …nancial sector increases the probability of four or more exceedances by 6%. Finally, the likelihood of observing bottom-tail events in four-or-more countries is statistically signi…cant at 1% level for the EURIBOR 3-month interest rate. The positive coe¢ cients of the interest rate are in line with the expectations. Higher reference rate for overnight transactions in the Euro area will signi…cantly increase the probability of stock market extreme tail events. In order to see the impact that this covariate has upon the coexceedances, I am taking the derivatives of probabilities with respect to the EURIBOR rate at regressor means. We can see that there is evidence that if the EURIBOR rate increase by 1.5%, the probability of negative joint exceedances will increase by 0.58%. In addition, the EURIBOR explanatory variable is signi…cant at 5% level as indicates the Wald test for zero exclusion.
To conclude, in this section, I found that in neither case is 10 year government bond yield and the EUR/USD exchange rate of importance and therefore it does not provide any substantial information. In other words, they fail to explain coexceedances happen in EA. According to the de…nition of contagion that I use this constitutes evidence of contagion. Adding the …nancial stock returns and the three interest rates to the model, increase the pseudo-R 2 up to 24%. 
The estimated results for the bottom and top tails are given in Table 7 . The most important …nding is that the regression coe¢ cients on the number of exceedances in the US are insigni…cant.
This means that US extreme returns do not seem to be helpful in predicting the number of negative extreme returns in EA. Using the de…nition of contagion according to which: contagion from US to EA can be de…ned as the fraction of the exceedance events in EA that is left unexplained by its own covariates but that is explained by the exceedances from US -this does not constitute evidence of contagion. I will rather interpret this as normal interdependence between the two regions.
For the other explanatory variable, the US stock market volatility, I found that is negative and statistically signi…cant at 1% level, for both bottom-and top-tail events. In other words, by looking at the coe¢ cients, this means that the higher the US volatility yesterday, the less likely it is to have extreme events on the Euro Area today; falling stock markets in US do not propagate or di¤use shock to EA. Furthermore, the Wald statistic indicate that we reject the null hypothesis that the volatility coe¢ cients are equal to zero, or equally the explanatory variable U SIvol t 1 is overall signi…cant at the 1% level of signi…cance. Unfortunately, there is paucity of studies matching the range of covariates that I am using and the sample period of my observations. For example, Bae et al. (2003) conclude that …rstly, the Europe's probability of negative extreme returns is signi…cantly a¤ected by extreme returns in US; and secondly that the e¤ect of the conditional volatility from the US is strangely negative. But bare in mind, that for the estimation of this result the authors plagued daily data from 1996 to 2000 into a binomial logit model.
Looking to other covariates, the EURIBOR interest rate is statistically signi…cant and negative for positive extreme returns. This sign is expected since lower interest rate will lower the cost for borrowing money and therefore will boost the stock market, consequently resulting to a higher probability of extreme positive returns. Contrary to that, in the previous section we saw that for top-tail events the rate was insigni…cant and did not add any explanatory power to the model.
Maybe this is due to some kind of interconnection between the rate at which European banks lent and borrow money from each other, with the US stock market.
Robustness checks
In this section I perform several checks in order to assess the robustness of the contagion e¤ect that I found within EA; and interdependence between the US and EA.
A concern with these results is that the number of exceedances in the US might not re ‡ect For Model 3, for bottom-tail events, EURIBOR rate and currency rate still insigni…cant, but now the government bonds provide useful information in predicting coexceedances occurring in three and four or more countries within the EA. To be more precise, there is a negative, as expected, relationship between the bond yields and the probability of extreme negative returns, negative coexceedances will occur when bond yields are low. If yield decrease by 10% the probability of three exceedances will increase by 1.6%.
When we turn to positive coexceedances, Model 4 of Table 15 , bond yields are still playing an important role, as their coe¢ cient is signi…cant for the case of four or more exceedances. The positive sign means that top-tail events are related to higher level of yields. Generally, for both positive and negative coexceedances, the 10 year government bond yield seem to have some explanatory and predicting power, especially on extreme events occurring three and four or more countries (regional crash). What is more, I found that EURIBOR rate is negatively related to positive coexceedances.
The lower the rate, the higher the occurrence of a positive regional shock. The Wald statistic indicates that this covariate is statistical signi…cant at 1% level. Finally, results for contagion from the US to EA (Table10) are similar to those of the base case in Table 7 , where the US exceedance variable fail to explain coexceedances in EA.
I use two more de…nitions of exceedances. Firstly, I de…ne exceedances by the 2.5% quantile rather than the 5% quantile. Obviously, proceeding this way there are fewer exceedances. Results (tables 17 and 18) from the multinomial logit model, are not sensitive to this alternative exceedance de…nition. Secondly, in order to allow for more general speci…cation regarding the period of exceedances and their dynamics within a region, I reestimate (not reported) all the model regressions, but use exceedances computed over three days instead of over one day. In that way, I de…ne coexceedance events as those in which more than one market experiences an extreme return within a three-day window. Once again, results, hardly di¤er from the original one in tables 5, 6 and 7. there is any evidence of contagion, …rst within the Euro Area region, and second, from the US to EA. The fraction of EA coexceedances that can not be explained by EA fundamentals-covrariates, constitutes evidence of contagion. Similarly, the fraction of the coexceedances in Europe that is left unexplained by its own covariates, but that is explained by the exceedances from the US, implies contagion from the US to EA. The results show that: a) the probability of extreme returns today is conditional upon the probability of extreme returns yesterday, extreme movements of stock prices followed by movements in the same direction; b) regional covariates, like bond yields and exchange rate do not seem to explain much about the probability of bottom-tail and top-tail events within the EA, consequently, there is evidence of contagion from this markets to the stock market; c) US exceedances fail to explain high probabilities of extreme negative returns in Europe,.there is no statistically signi…cant evidence of contagion e¤ect from the US to the EU.
There is a long list of several extensions that would be accommodated in the framework and are likely to improve performance. First, it would be very interesting to implement this model in order to include other regions, like Asia and Latin America, and look for contagion in a global way.
Second, one could consider alternative estimation approaches. It is well known, and mentioned by Bae et al. (2003) , that multinomial models are unordered models, which means that they fail to account for the ordinal nature of the coexceedances. Table 3 Number of Coexceedances Based on the 5% and 95% Percentile of the GARCH ( 
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